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1 Introduction
Research on entrepreneurship has always been a controversial topic in economic the-
orizing. The significance of entrepreneurship is emphasized by almost all authors
working on innovation economics, nevertheless, most of the research work comes to
an end at a purely appreciative level. Still, a consistent theory of entrepreneurship
is missing; a theory that is adequate to combine the various strands of literature in
order to come to an empirically testable model, eventually. Besides the early theo-
ries that approach entrepreneurship from a rather intuitive perspective, to be traced
back to Schumpeter (1997), Schumpeter (1939), Kirzner (1973) and Kirzner (1999), a
modern evolutionary approach should also contain some specific theories such as the
theory of human capital (e.g. Schlutz (1975), social networks (e.g. Granovetter (1983))
and Neo-Schumpeterian Economics (e.g. Loasby (1999)). In the following paper we
develop an eclectic approach by designing an analytical model open to be applied to
different industries and historical settings.
Core element of our model are the actors. Even though there are two bipolar views
that either explicitly focus on actors or take a more general approach emphasizing the
actors’ environment only, for our purpose we draw on the actor-centered perspective.
Therefore, we do not look at them from the perspective of a situative determinism
and optimal behavior, but we characterize the individual actors as procedural ratio-
nal, struggling in a trial-and-error process for survival and prosperity. Consequently,
in their entrepreneurial decision they do not know the potential economic outcome
but experimentally try different combinations. The actors in our model are heteroge-
neous in their individual endowment concerning their accumulated human capital,
their available venture capital as well as their entrepreneurial attitude. We further-
more stress the importance of individuals’ networks in the process of firm foundation
as a social phenomenon. The formation of social networks is approximated by a ran-
dom permutation process within our population of actors. In detail, an arbitrary
number of actors, not yet involved in a firm, are randomly matched in each period.
The comprehensive endowment of the group’s actors constitutes their potential to
found a firm. Whether a new firm is founded or not depends on their respective
environment. In particular, they take into account the industry’s economic devel-
opment. As they obviously do not have perfect knowledge about all critical factors
which drive an industry’s development, they evaluate the average industry’s perfor-
mance by a chosen set of economic indicators. These evaluation criteria can be seen
as the actors’ threshold to establish a firm. Only in those cases where the actors’ per-
ceived comprehensive endowment appears to be sufficient to enter a market and the
expected economic future signals promising rewards, a new firm is born. Doing this,
the birth process has an influence on the industry level, which in return has a feed-
back effect on the micro-level which is the future decision process of others to found a
firm. Thus we manage to model a micro-macro relationship which is essential for the
endogenous evolution of the foundation threshold, taking place in historical time.
Whereas the act of founding a firm depends on the individuals’ perceptions and
on the evaluation of their current (micro- and macro-economic) situation, the firm’s
economic success, once founded, is determined by the individuals’ resources and
their specific managerial capabilities, which are embedded in the combination and
complementarities of their skills. In short; their human capital. Accordingly, in the
short run, the survival of the firm decisively depends on a balanced relationship be-
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tween human capital and venture capital. Missing human capital cannot be substi-
tuted by venture capital and eventually might lead to insolvency. As the firm has
to invest its funds profitably within a certain period of time it faces a bottleneck in
human capital in the case of a maladjusted relationship. In the long run, however, the
economic success of a firm depends on its competitiveness, which in our model - for
the sake of simplicity - is determined by its stock of human capital and its learning
capabilities to improve on it. If the firm has to exit, again, this has a feedback effect
on the foundation threshold. Due to the heterogeneous composition of actors and
their experimentally organized behavior, our model is illustrated numerically for the
time being. In our first simulation experiments we are able to show the emergence of
new industries and their endogenous evolution from a theoretical stance. Firms do
not appear continuously but in swarms showing a high degree of sensitivity to the
coincidence of entrepreneurial behavior and environmental conditions. Our model
is designed in a very general way and the promising results achieved so far advo-
cates to apply this basic setting to recent empirical observations of developments of
new industries. Finally, this should improve our knowledge about conditions favor-
ing/hindering the up-coming of successful knowledge-intensive industries such as
the information technology and biotechnology sector, respectively. This will be the
agenda for our future research.
2 Theoretical motivation
2.1 A Historical sketch and a conglomeration of entrepreneurial
functions and ideas
The importance of entrepreneurial behavior for economic development has always
been stressed in economic history but the existence of entrepreneurship in ortho-
dox economic theory has almost been undetectable. Economists wonder why the
entrepreneur has almost vanished in economic theory.1 The reason apparently is that
with the introduction of entrepreneurial behavior in orthodox theory a model runs
the risk to lose its consistency, and therefore the entrepreneur still remained a stranger
in economic theory. Classical economists touched this subject matter more than neo-
classical theory, based on the equilibrium concept, might ever be able to do. Its strict,
methodological apparatus appears to rule out the possibility to pick out an endoge-
nous equilibrium-disturbing element as the center piece of economic development.
The first who took up thinking about the role of entrepreneurs in economy was
Cantillon (1680’s - 1734).2 He classified the economic agents into three groups: (1)
landowners (2) entrepreneurs and (3) hirelings.3 Whereas the first and the third group
are characterized as being rather passive, the entrepreneurs play the central part in
his Essai sur la nature du commerce en ge´ne´ral. They play the role of the coordinator con-
necting producers with consumers, and, additionally, the role of the decision maker
engaging in markets to earn profits and struggling with uncertainty. His concept
1Barreto (1989)
2Cantillon (1931)
3see He´bert and Link (1982) for an overview.
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of uncertainty was constrained to the entrepreneurs, though, and it had to wait for
Frank Knight (1921)4 for a detailed distinction between risk and uncertainty as an
economy-wide feature affecting all economic agents. Cantillon was also the first who
emphasized the entrepreneur’s economic function while distinguishing it from the
agents’ social status. A functional perspective was maintained by Cantillon’s succes-
sors associated with the French school. Quesnay5, the precursor of ’The Physiocrats’,
shifted the field of concentration to the significance of capital for economic growth,
thereby reducing the role of the entrepreneur - instead of an industry leader - to a
pure independent owner of a business, though endowed with individual energy, and
intelligence.6
Baudeau (1919)7 was the first to suggest the function of the entrepreneur as an
innovator and thus brought invention and innovation into the discussion. Further-
more, he emphasized the ability to process knowledge and information, which makes
the entrepreneur a lively and active economic agent. Another rather capitalistic view
was set up by Jacques Turgot8 (1727-1781). According to him, the entrepreneur is the
outcome of a capitalist investment decision: The owner of capital either can simply
lend his money and just be a capitalist, or decide to buy land for lease and, hence, be-
come a landowner, or he decides to buy goods to run a business and thus become an
entrepreneur automatically. Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832)9 continued Turgot’s ideas
and elevated the entrepreneur to a key figure in economic life. In contrast to Tur-
got he made a sharp distinction between the entrepreneur and the capitalist. The
entrepreneur might give capital to a firm but he does not have to. Consequently,
this also allows for a negligence of risk and uncertainty,10 when considering the en-
trepreneurial element explicitly. Say suggested a twofold approach. He looked at the
entrepreneur from an empiric perspective to find out the actual entrepreneurial be-
havior which he tried to reduce in a second step to a general entrepreneurial theory
by subtracting all incidental aspects attributable to certain social and institutional cir-
cumstances.11 The function of his entrepreneur was to understand technology and to
be able to transfer that knowledge into a tradable product that meets the customers’
needs.
Say paved the road to Schumpeter’s theory on entrepreneurship. And Schum-
peter’s entrepreneurial concept has to be seen as the pivotal point in this field of
research. Most of the economists before Schumpeter - with some exceptions - worked
within equilibrium theory and most of the theories on entrepreneurship after Schum-
peter are built on his ideas.12
Before we proceed to the discussion of Schumpeter’s concept, we briefly have to
expose the neoclassical treatment of the entrepreneur.
4Knight (1921)
5Quesnay (1888)
6He´bert and Link (1982, p. 31)
7Baudeau (1919)
8Turgot (1977)
9Say (1840) and also Say (1845)
10delimiting Say’s concept from Cantillon’s
11He´bert and Link (1982)
12see He´bert and Link (1982)
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2.2 Neoclassical Constraints
The question ”What about the entrepreneur in orthodox neoclassical theory?” is easy
to answer, but it takes quite an effort to set out the argumentation. The answer is:
There is no space for an entrepreneur in neoclassical theory. The according discussion
can be found in Barreto (1989)’s work ’The Entrepreneur in Microeconomic Theory’,
where he portrays the disappearance of the entrepreneur in economic theory.13 He
shows that on the advent of the modern theory of the firm, economists lost track of the
entrepreneur. Basically, the assumptional framework does not allow for a consistent
implementation of entrepreneurial behavior. The bone of content is rooted in the
perfect rationality assumption which is a necessary condition for optimal behavior.
This does not allow for a ’real’ choice and the treatment of true uncertainty subject to
entrepreneurial behavior, which burns down the role of the entrepreneur to a static
and passive and therefore redundant economic agent within a self-running firm. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to recount the anamnesis of the entrepreneur in
economic theory. Basically, Schumpeter’s legacy can be regarded as the outcome of
such kind of reflection.
2.3 Schumpeter’s entrepreneur
To tell the story the right way, we cannot start right at Schumpeter’s concept of the en-
trepreneur. As mentioned above, Schumpeter’s work was tremendously influenced
by a critical review on equilibrium theory. Though fascinated by Walras’ system of
equilibrium, he stated that equilibrium theory contributed as much as it can; but fur-
ther insights cannot be expected.14 Schumpeter’s circular flow is a less formal repre-
sentation of Walras’ general equilibrium theory.15 To reach equilibrium, Schumpeter
suggests that economic actors’ decisions and actions have to be repeated over and
over again in the same way, so that eventually all actors’ plans coincide to end up
in equilibrium. This result Schumpeter calls a static situation that does not allow for
change.16 His aim was to investigate the dynamics behind the empirically observable
economic change. The explanatory element he called innovations, the economic agent
to bring along innovations (i.e. ”new combinations”) he called the entrepreneur.
When we look back to the existing literature at that time, Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial
concept is a synthesis of, firstly, Say’s and Badeau’s work and, secondly, the critique
13Barreto (1989)
14Surely, Walras was not the only one who influenced Schumpeter’s thinking. There are many others that
delievered preparatory work such as Marx, Weber, Menger, Wieser, Say, Hayek, Bo¨hm-Bawerk to name a
few. But as the equilibrium concept being the bone of content we quote Warlas in this context. See He´bert
and Link (1982) for a quick overview.
15Although Schumpeter was fascinated by Walras concept of equilibrium, the bifurcation point of their
intellectual paths originated in the different treatment of the subject. Walras thought it to be permissible to
abstrahize beyond the adjustment processes in an economic system starting right at the end, which is the
equilibrium (See Walras (1995)). Schumpeter concentrated more on the process that destroys equilibrium
and, if at all, might lead to equilibrium.
16Barreto (1989)
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associated with the Austrian school.17 Schumpeter’s entrepreneur was and still is the
most renowned concept. Therefore, we also take it as the intellectual foundation of
our model. Another economist to be mentioned in this context is Israel Kirzner.
2.4 Kirzner and the Austrian school
There is a long-lasting debate, partly stirred up by Kirzner himself, about what the
significant difference between Schumpeter’s an Kirzner’s entrepreneur is. Both Schum-
peter and Kirzner took up on the Austrian critique on general equilibrium theory.
Whereas Schumpeter developed a - to our minds - more general approach to en-
trepreneurship starting out at economic change, Kirzner focused on the market pro-
cess. For the reader’s convenience, the intuition of the Austrian school is to be re-
called briefly: Equilibrium theory neglects market processes. If all plans of economic
actors match, then, there is no need for markets. In a state of disequilibrium, how-
ever, actors’ plans do not match. They have to be revised and adapted to the new
market situation.18 The economic agents have to change their minds continuously
and thus generate a dynamic process which Kirzner calls the market process.19 That
suggests to make a Robbins-type of maximization calculation20 impossible. Mises21
solved this task by introducing human action.22 Besides the agents’ attempt to cal-
culate economic problems, they are also alert to opportunities. Once an economic
agent recognizes a market opportunity, he acts on it to improve his position. And
opportunities are abundant in a situation of disequilibrium. That is where Kirzner’s
entrepreneur comes from. While von Mises admitted the ability of human action
to every economic agent, Kirzner confined it to a certain group of agents which he
labeled entrepreneurs. Hence, the entrepreneur, as an arbitrageur that equilibrates
markets, was born.23
2.5 A word on the Schumpeter-Kirzner-entrepreneur discussion
Kirzner himself24 distinguished the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, as the innovator
and the creative destructor of equilibrium, from his own, the equilibrating entrepreneur
alert to market opportunitites. We leave it two the reader’s taste to make this distinc-
tion between an equilibrium-disturbing and an equilibrium-creating entrepreneur.
17Ludiwg von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek as the alleged leaders of the Austrian school engaged in the
analysis of disequilibrium conditions focusing on market processes. To get a good intuition of Hayek’s at-
titude towards mainstream economics, see Hayek (1990). Concerning Ludwig von Mises, some necessary
amendments will be given when introducing Kirnzer’s entrepreneur later on in this paper.
18This is the point to stress the role of information and knowledge as Hayek, Mises and Kirzner do.
19Kirzner (1973, p.10)
20Robbins puts forward the economic agents task to economize on scarce resources efficiently. But Efficiency
is no more possible in an Austrian-school-like market-process (Robbins (1962)).
21von Mises (1959)
22Barreto (1989, p.17)
23Barreto (1989, p.21)
24Kirzner (1999)
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As a matter of perspective, if we allow to think of the alertness to market opportuni-
ties and the agent’s implied human action as being a part of innovativeness neglecting
the question whether a state of equilibrium in a dynamic economic world will ever be
reached before another dynamic entrepreneur comes to prevent economy from equi-
librium, it would leave us with the center-piece of the Schumpeterian dynamics of
economic change, i.e. the entrepreneur. In short, Schumpeter’s stream of conscious-
ness looks as follows: No entrepreneur - no innovation - no dynamics - no evolution.
2.6 ”Giving up the Grail”
Ever since economists started to theorize on human behavior, they have been look-
ing for consistency in theory. What classical theorists could not achieve, neoclassical
economists succeeded in. The marginal school and in particular the Walrasian gen-
eral equilibrium theory eliminated the shortcomings in terms of inconsistency within
economic theory. They managed to refine the patchwork of classical thoughts to a
consistent unity, but - as we see from the discussion above - at the cost of the en-
trepreneur. On the contrary, if we give up on the equilibrium concept, for the sake of
the entrepreneur, we might run the risk of losing consistency in return. Then, we have
to do disequilibrium economics without such a powerful mathematical apparatus of
the neoclassical school. Equilibirium needs optimal behavior. Optimal behavior needs
perfect rationality. Perfect rationality requires perfect foresight and information. Regard-
less which of these assumptions we relax, at the same time we question the validity
of the remaining ones, and, even worse, we question the methodological approach.
This all foreshadows another era of patchwork in economic theory, concerning the
investigation of entrepreneurship, until an appropriate methodology will be found.
These misgivings can be confirmed, when we look at the existing literature which
refers to entrepreneurship and at the same time abandons the equilibrium concept.
3 An evolutionary approach to an evolutionary concept
of the entrepreneur
”. . . the word ’evolutionary’ is extremely vague. It is now widely used,
even by economists using neoclassical techniques. ”Evolutionary game
theory” is highly fashionable. Even Walras is described as an evolutionary
economist Jolink (1996). . . . In precise terms it signifies little or nothing.”25
For this reason, we decided to discuss briefly what evolutionary means to our
minds. The model presented in this paper is meant to be a general approach to en-
trepreneurship delivering constructive propositions for a basic evolutionary setting.
Consolidating the critique of Schumpeter, the body of thought from the Austrian
School and, accordingly, Kirzners adaptations to the entrepreneurial case, research
on entrepreneurship becomes the pivotal point of a micro-based evolutionary theory.
25Hodgson (2000)
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A lot of issues are addressed that burn down to questioning the phenomenon of in-
novation in an economic system. Innovation means novelty and in accordance with
Arrow’s epistemological reservation, an assumptional chart house built on perfect
foresight (complete information), which means perfect rationality, is a contradiction
in itself. It ignores economic change spurred by the dynamic entrepreneur. Each
of the assumptions mentioned above entails a huge discussion leading to various
strands of literature. Of course, it is not the aim of this paper to cover all of it, but
they have to be taken into account, implicitly.26
Along these lines, in our model we begin at the micro-level. The agents are het-
erogeneous and differ in their individual endowment. Information is incomplete,
in particular with respect to the future economic development. Because of imper-
fect foresight, agents have to deal with true uncertainty.27 Furthermore, the bounded
rational28 agents are limited in their cognitive capabilities to perceive and process
the accumulated information. Owing to the high degree of novelty attached to en-
trepreneurial behavior, true uncertainty does not allow for a calculation of expected
values. The agent neither knows the set of possible outcomes nor the correspond-
ing probabilities. As we thus deprive the agents from optimizing capabilities, they
have to make decisions best to their knowledge. They have to perform, in the words
of Mises, human action. Thereto, the agents have to form expectations on various
respects: at first they have to evaluate their individual endowment of resources, ca-
pabilities and competencies, second, the possibilities to acquire missing complemen-
tarities (to be specified later on) and third, the ”economic situation”.
The light of perfect rationality missing, agents consequently make individual fore-
casts motivated by their personality29 and current (economic) environmental factors.
To put it in other words: decisions are the outcome of a path-dependent process: the
evolution of the agent’s individual (accumulated) endowment (resources, capabili-
ties, competencies (including experience)) and non-individual, environmental factors
subsuming the economic situation. The latter gives us the notion of feedback effects.
The economic agents’ decisions are influenced by economic factors (economic situa-
tion) and in return influence economic factors by their actions, e.g. by the decision to
establish a firm. It goes without saying that we implicitly consider irreversibility to
round off the assumptional frame of our evolutionary perspective.
In the following, we flesh it out with some less abstract ideas of entrepreneurial
behavior. Since our main intention is to show the basic structure of an evolutionary
model of entrepreneurship, we decided to tolerate some simplifications.
3.1 Actors
We divide an agent’s individual endowment into three components which we call
entrepreneurial spirit, human capital and venture capital. These three factors form
26For a succinct setting of an evolutionary theory see for example Nelson (1995)
27As the reference work on uncertainty see Knight (1921) and his distinction between risk and uncertainty.
In the entrepreneurial context we have to deal with ’true’ uncertainty. The agent does neither know the
outcome nor is he able to calculate corresponding probabilities.
28To this discussion see e.g. Simon and Egidi (1992).
29By personality we mean the conglomerate of accumulated knowledge, information and experience
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the individual agent.30
3.1.1 Entrepreneurial component
The entrepreneurial component can be thought of as the residual of the agent’s in-
dividual endowment which withdraws itself from empirical measurability. It com-
prises the intangible characteristics of the heroic Schumpeter entrepreneur. Doing
this, we follow empirical evidence that does not allow to detect a stereotypic en-
trepreneur and furthermore, we take up on Mises saying that every human being has
the potential of human action.
3.1.2 Human capital
With the second component we refer to one of the more successful strands of research.
The human capital approach, constituted by Theodor W. Schultz31 and elaborated by
Gary S. Becker among others,32 allows for an empirical application. It tries to explain
optimal investment in human capital and delivers insights on income distribution.
The theoretical concept is basically derived from investment theory in physical capital
using marginal analysis. We do not use the human capital concept this way,33 but we
emphasize the importance of human capital for establishing a firm. Agents do not
know the actual return when they decide in favor of founding a firm, they might do
so when offering their human capital to the labor market. Therefore, agents decide in
a dichotomous way; if they expect the returns of going entrepreneurial will be higher
than being an employee, they will decide to become an entrepreneur.
Moreover, we refer to the literature on knowledge originating from the Austrian
School,34 which discusses the importance of knowledge in a disequilibrium situation
- that is - a situation of uncertainty. Loasby (1999) gives a good intuition on ”Knowl-
edge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics”.35 For our purpose, we interpret the
agents’ role of human capital as the crucial productive element for the long-run sur-
vival of the firm, once it is founded by the agents.
3.1.3 Venture capital
The third element we include into the agents’ endowment vector is the component
of venture capital. Herewith, we pay tribute to the discussion whether ”the roles of
30Each component is the result of a cumulative evolutionary process which will not be discussed in this
paper. With respect to an empirical application, each component requires sector-specific observations.
31Schlutz (1971)
32Becker (1993)
33We are conscious of our tightrope walk to use a strictly neoclassical concept within our model that we
explicitly claim to be evolutionary. We assume a link between the agents’ set of capabilities and their
economic performance. For the time being, we rather use it as a metaphor to stress the importance of
knowledge in our model leaving the necessary ”evolutionary” clarification of this concept for further
research.
34Hayek (1990)
35Loasby (1999)
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capitalist and entrepreneur” can be separated. The ”early French view” rather saw
the entrepreneur as a risk bearer; the ”English view” identified the entrepreneur as
the capitalist. Schumpeter (1939) discusses the role of money, too.36 The bottom line
is that potential entrepreneurs need to have capital to start their business, no matter
if they own it themselves or borrow it from others. Empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that entrepreneurs in general face financial and liquidity constraints.37
The intuition we draw out of this discussion is that we assume each agent to be
endowed with a certain amount of capital he can spend on a business venture. Again,
we do not bother about the details, whether he inherited or accumulated a certain
amount of money by saving.
So far, we have characterized the individual agents by their endowment factors.38
Each actor possesses the potential to be an entrepreneur as von Mises suggests from
a theoretic perspective and - as empirical data shows - most agents express to have.39
Thereby, the decision (human action) is no behavior of optimality, calculating what
the maximal return to total - human and (free disposable) venture - capital is. Al-
though, the long-run survival of a firm once founded is highly dependent on the
agent’s human capital. As we vested all agents with the option to own venture capi-
tal, we can incorporate the notion of risk bearing and uncertainty. But as we will see
later on, the ”mainly”40 entrepreneurial agent need not be the risk bearer.41
Even though an agent might have a certain amount of every component, neces-
sary to establish a firm, he might not have enough of it. In that case, the agent needs
to complete the minimum endowment necessary to his mind. Consequently, we in-
troduce a network approach to entrepreneurship.
3.2 Social Networks
To complete the minimal endowment - whereby it still has to be defined what min-
imal means - actors can choose several ways to acquire these endowment factors.
They have to figure out how to get access to required resources (Penrose (1959)) and
whether the necessary competence to combine these resources (Foss (1993)) is avail-
able. To insinuate on Coase (1988), some of the resources and competencies can be
inherent to the agent, others have to be acquired on the market or otherwise. We will
not go further down this road and leave that task to a modern evolutionary theory of
the firm still to be developed,42 since we do not argue on the firm level but, following
Birley (1985), investigate the ”pre-organization” phase in order to stress the impor-
36Schumpeter (1939)
37Blanchflower and Oswald (1995)
38Besides the suggested endowment factors any other desired factor can be included into the endowment
set.
39see Blanchflower and Oswald (1995)
40As we proceed we will not confine the entrepreneurial behavior to a single agent but to a number of
agents
41This goes along the lines of Schumpeter (1939, chapter: Entrepreneur)
42We could include learning into the model and thus reflect on the human capital component. Coase
(1937),Penrose (1959), Demsetz (1973),Wernerfelt (1984) will definitely give enough inspiration to extent
our model.
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tance of an agent’s social network as a main source of help to obtain resources and
competencies to start a business.
Furthermore, we discuss the role of social networks43 for two reasons. First, for
methodological reasons: By implementing social networks into the model, we ”climb
up the aggregation ladder” one step further and, thus, leave the micro-level (individ-
ual’s level) to bring the agent’s social context into discussion. Second, for empirical
reasons: personality-based theories - that is, purely micro-based theories - try to find
personal traits unique to entrepreneurs.44 Nevertheless, these attempts have not yet
been successful to identify the entrepreneur when not considering the social group
context.45
It is beyond the scope of this paper and not our intention to discuss social net-
work theory comprehensively. As we put together existing fragmental theories on
entrepreneurship in an evolutionary model setting, with social networks we incorpo-
rate another critical element to entrepreneurial behavior.46
4 The Model
In the following section we introduce the basic structure of our model of entrepreneur-
ship evolution. The model is designed in a very general form so that it will eventually
allow us to investigate different scenarios and furthermore to implement relation-
ships and specificities of certain sectors. In a way the basic design has to be seen as a
platform approach allowing several extensions with regard to the theoretic perspec-
tive as well as with regard to a close look at the empirical sphere.
4.1 The Actors
To model the evolution of entrepreneurship and the founding of new firms, we ob-
viously have to go one step further down the micro-level, i.e. not only down to the
firm-level but to the individual actors’ level and in particular to the individuals’ spe-
cific endowment. The individuals are characterized by the crucial features identified
in the previous section: i) entrepreneurial spirit est
i
, which describes an actor’s ten-
dency not to become an employee but an independent firm leader; ii) human capital
43Granovetter (1983)
44see Aldrich and Wiedenmayer (1993) as an example.
45Hall (1982)
46In case agents do not have a sufficient set of endowments and, hence, need additional resources, comple-
mentary assets and competencies, networking plays an important and a manifold role. Not only provides
the social network the opportunity to have access to additional and complementary endowment factors,
networks have a crucial influence on the actual entrepreneurial decision to start a venture itself. Suppose
a single agent thinks himself not to be able to start a business all by himself, he has to convince others in
order to be supported. Otherwise, the lack of legitimacy may prevent entrepreneurial actions. Whereas a
high degree of innovativeness, the so-called liability of newness, might be ended by an agent’s objecting
social network, a synergetic outcome of either strong or weak ties within a network can be an enhanced
and by the group subjectively high-valued business idea. In other words: a social network functions as a
catalyst to spark a venture. See Efring and Baden-Fuller (2000).
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4.2 Matching Process and Founding Threshold
For each iteration the population of actors not yet involved in a firm is permuted and
k different actors are randomly brought together in order to evaluate their chances to
found a possibly successful firm. For this purpose, we consider the specific attributes
of the actors to be additive so that also a potential firm pf t
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can be characterized by
the triple of attributes of its k members:
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so that the set of potential firms at time t is
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where q 2 f1; : : : ;mg denotes the specific potential firm and m the number of
potential firms, i.e. the number of temporarily formed k-groups q in period t. Each
group of actors has to evaluate if their comprehensive endowment cet
q
, which for sim-
plicity is equal to pf t
q
, is adequate. Yet, the actors’ mere perception of their common
resources, attitudes and motivation is not the only determinant for founding a firm.
The actors involved are also influenced by their environment and the respective mood
within the population. For modelling reasons, we introduce the so-called founding
or entry threshold 	t, a ”meso-macroeconomic signal” which endogenously depends
negatively on the growth rate of the sector’s turnover wt which in return decreases
the threshold. Furthermore it depends positively on the rate of exits dt of firms in the
respective industry which increases the threshold:
	
t
= 	

dw
t
dt
; d
t

(5)
If the k-group’s, that is the potential firm pf t
q
’s, comprehensive endowment cet
q
ex-
ceeds the foundation threshold 	t, the k actors decide to found a firm, thus the poten-
tial firm pf t
q
turns into an actual firm f t
j
, and the formerly potential firm’s comprehen-
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sive endowment cet
q
becomes the actual founded firm’s comprehensive endowment
ce
t
j
. (6) gives the set of newly founded firms F t
new
in period t:
F
t
new
=

pf
t
q
: pf
t
q
> 	
t
	
pf
t
q
2PF
t
(6)
Hence, the set of all firms that have been founded up to time t is given in (7),
whereby (8) gives the firm j’s comprehensive endowment.
F
t
=

f
t
j
	
j2f1;:::;x
t
g
,
T
[
0
F
t
new
(7)
f
t
j
= ce
t
j
= ce
 
k
X
i=1
es
t
i
;
k
X
i=1
hc
t
i
;
k
X
i=1
vc
t
i
!
j2f1;:::;x
t
g;i2a
(8)
If the threshold is not exceeded, the option to found a firm, for the time given, is
rejected by the actors. Consequently, the actors that do not get engaged in a firm are
free to go for further trials in the following period. In the case of a successful founda-
tion of a firm f t
j
with j 2 f1; : : : ; xtg the k actors involved are no longer available to
found another firm. At the same time, this reduces the probability for other actors to
find adequate partners. On the other hand, according to equation (9) the number of
existing firms xt is increased by the number of firms F t
new
founded within a period,
thereby also exerting a positive influence on the sector’s aggregate turnover which
positively feeds back on the founding threshold in the next period.
x
t
= x
t 1
+ j F
t
new
j (9)
x
t := number of firms in the industry at time t.
4.3 Survival and Exit
Whether a firm f t
j
survives in the market or is threatened by exit critically depends on
its set and composition of aggregated capabilities as well as on the turnover that firm
is able to acquire. Most simply, we assume for a firm’s turnover that it is positively in-
fluenced by its aggregated human capital hct
j
=
P
1
i=1
hc
t
i
and its aggregated venture
capital vct
j
=
P
1
i=1
vc
t
i
. In order to approximate a positive influence of experience
also the accumulated turnovers
P
t
w
t 1
j
exert a positive influence:
w
t
j
= w
 
  hc
t
j
;   vc
t
j
;  
X
t
w
t 1
j
!
(10)
; ;  := weighting parameters.
Finally, in cases where the composition of a firm’s ft
j
specific characteristics shows
an unfavorable relation with respect to a relatively low amount of human capital
hc
t
j
compared to its venture capital vct
j
, we introduce a so-called burning rate wt
j
(equation (11)) which depreciates the available capital in the course of time according
to equation (12):
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!t
j
=
8
<
:
0 if
hc
t
j
vc
t
j
 1
hc
t
j
vc
t
j
if
hc
t
j
vc
t
j
< 1
(11)
vc
t
j
= vc
t
j
    !
t
j
(12)
 := weighting parameter. A firm has to exit the market in the cases its venture
capital vct
j
is reduced to zero.
4.4 Basic Structure of the Model
Figure 1 summarizes the basic structure of the model.
To start with, we distinguish several levels of analysis: the actors level, the firm
level and the sector level. The entrepreneurial process primarily takes place on the
actors level. A set of actors with heterogeneous endowments is given. Actors form
social networks that change over time, expressed by a random matching process.
The actors, grouped together, constitute a potential firm. Since they neither have per-
Figure 1: Basic structure of the model
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fect foresight nor complete information about future prospects, their decision will be
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myopic, based on their common evaluation of the economic situation which is influ-
enced by their subjective perception of measurable economic indicators. The more
economic indicators paint a promising picture of a possibly prosperous outcome of
entrepreneurial actions, the lower the threshold for actors to decide in favor of such
action. The same holds vice versa. If actors decide against founding a firm, they
return to the set of actors available for another trial to evaluate entrepreneurial ac-
tions within a changed social environment. If they decide to found a firm, the firm
is established and actors’ resources are bounded within the firm so that they are ex-
cluded from a further firm founding process. On the sector level, the firm is forced
to compete with incumbent firms. Their competitiveness is determined by their com-
prehensive set of endowments constituted by the founding actors individual endow-
ments. The selection process, which is competition, has an effect on each firm either
worsening or improving its fitness to stand future competition. The short-run exit
criterion, competing ”for the market”, is insolvency. Firms with an unbalanced set
of endowments run out of money and finally have to exit the market. The long-run
selection process via market competition, or to put it in other words ”competition in
the market”, decides over the competitiveness of the actual business idea.
5 Results
In this section we present some of the first simulation results of the model. Though
our focus is put on entrepreneurial behavior, we have to take a rather holistic view.
Combining the manifold theoretical contributions in the realm of the analysis of en-
trepreneurial behavior, we also have to touch some peripherals of the subject investi-
gated in order to show the endogenous dynamics of entrepreneurship. Otherwise, it
would not be possible to include the feedback effects suggested in the model. Never-
theless, we neglect a further specification of those peripheral, economic phenomena
and leave it with a purely theoretical case. The simulations, we ran, all show the
same qualitative features. A Monte-Carlo simulation to support our findings still has
to be done. To start with a stereotypical development of the emerging sectors’ total
Figure 2: Overall turnover of the emerging sector
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turnover, see figure 2. Once firms are founded, the industry’s total turnover increases
sharply. The high growth rates at the beginning function as a signal for other eco-
nomic actors to enter the market (to innovate), too. From a certain point in time on,
as competitive pressure increases, with more and more firms entering the market and
as market diffusion proceeds, growth rates decline though remaining positive. Thus,
the total turnover curve takes a stylized sigmoid shape. Firms do not enter all at
once. Some enter early whereas others enter at a later point in time. Early entrants
might have a first-mover advantage whereas late entrants might have to struggle for
survival competing with larger firms. It is not just the time of entry that makes firms
different but also their set of endowments that is crucial for their economic develop-
ment. Figure 3 shows the heterogeneity of firms by indicating the emerging sectors’
variance in turnover.
Figure 3: Variance of turnovers
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Taking a closer look at the firms’ heterogeneity we selected some firms with a
stereotypical development. In figure 4 we see what intuitively seems to be obvious,
the earlier a firm enters the better it is able to increase its market share. All the same,
there is no guarantee for first-movers to survive. The first-mover in the diagram dom-
inates the market until it is outperformed by the two successive firms and eventually
has to exit the market because of insolvency caused by an imbalanced set of endow-
ments within the firm. Best practice is shown by firm 5 which is a relatively late en-
trant but dominates the market until the end of the simulation run. The performance,
which is the growth rate, the
size and the time span of survival, is dependent on the firm’s set of endowments.
This should suffice for a rough description of the endogenous development of the
sector as we do not discuss market structure and firm size.
With figure 5 we put forward a rather cognitive argument which we consider the
guiding element of entrepreneurial behavior. Actors have to evaluate their chances
to found a potentially successful firm. Due to their bounded rationality, they have
to decide on grounds of their accumulated knowledge and experiences whether to
found a firm or not. They make a subjective decision which is influenced by their
perception of market opportunities, represented by the individuals interpretation of
the economic indicators. The higher a sector’s growth rates are, the better market
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Figure 4: Turnover of firms within the sector
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Figure 5: Founding threshold
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opportunities are evaluated, hence, the actors’ inhibitedness for entrepreneurial be-
havior decreases and more and more firms are founded. Thus the foundation thresh-
old decreases until compensating effects set in: With an increasing number of firms
in the market, the competitive thread is increased. Furthermore, growth rates shrink
and some firms already have to exit the market. As economic indicators get worse
the foundation threshold starts rising. Correspondingly, we observe a swarm of en-
trepreneurs (figure 6) along the plummeting foundation threshold and a decreasing
number of firm entries when exits occur first. The foundation threshold starts rising
again. Fewer actors evaluate market opportunities positive and found a firm. Exits
exceed entries (figure 7).
Figure 6: Number of new firms per period
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Figure 7: Net entries per period
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Since we have only introduced the sector’s growth rate in turnover and the num-
ber of exits as two of many other measurable economic indicators influencing the ac-
tors perception of the real economic situation, the founding threshold keeps on rising
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after plummeting once. Therefore, the formation of new firms fades out gradually.
So do exits, as we have not yet implemented the long-run selection process, ”compe-
tition in the market”. This shows that there are still some chores to be done in our
future research work.
6 Concluding Remarks and further Research
We developed a model of entrepreneurial behavior which we claim to be an evolu-
tionary one. Once again, we emphasize that we explicitly consider the entrepreneurial
behavior, the birth process of firms and industries; a further discussion of the indus-
try life cycle is not intended. The core elements of the model are the heterogeneity of
actors, their bounded rational behavior to make myopic decisions in favor of found-
ing a firm (which might eventually lead to sub-optimal outcomes), the feedback ef-
fects from the micro- to the macro- level and vice versa, the (irreversible) historicity
of events and the variation and selection mechanisms that put the economic process
into a dynamic context.
Not using an equilibrium concept and nor assuming optimal behavior, we manage
to avoid a ”survivor bias” at least from a theoretical point of view: some actors decide
to run a firm even though they have to exit in the short run because of a lack in the
necessary and adequate comprehensive endowment.
Economic change is brought along, firstly, by the actual economic development
driven by the market process and, secondly, by the changing attitude of actors driven
by their perception of the economic situation.
At the beginning of the up-coming new sector, actors have to deal with true un-
certainty prevailing the decision-making process; the more actors have to rely on
their subjective and possibly ”false” intuition concerning their entrepreneurial ac-
tions, which leads to market turbulence in the early phase of the sectors life cycle. As
time goes by, actors are more and more able to understand new technologies, to assess
market opportunities and their chances for a successful innovative, entrepreneurial
behavior; consequently, uncertainty decreases, more precise predictions and more
careful decisions will be made so that stabilizing forces set in.
Our future research work is motivated by empirical applications. Therefore, some
specifications will be necessary. Starting at the actors level, we have to investigate the
actors individual set of endowments in order to identify the actual essential compo-
nents that spur entrepreneurial behavior, including the creative process of generating
a business idea. Besides, a possible classification of actors and the formation process
of their social networks that have an impact on entrepreneurial behavior have to be
considered. In this context, we will have to introduce an interaction-based compo-
nent into our model to illustrate the qualities of the actors’ search process.
The most challenging part of our future research work will be to analyze the cog-
nitive part of the story, which is the role of the founding threshold. It is to investigate
the way economic actors perceive the economic situation and a universal metal con-
struct comes into existence leading to a bandwagon effect in entrepreneurial actions
showing swarms of innovations.
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